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This article develops a model for pricing deposit guarantees.  The model treats the bank's 
investments as a portfolio of  default-free bonds and risky loans.  The risk of the loans is 
determined by individual firms' financing and investment decisions.  Pushing back risk to 
the level of the borrowing firms allows us to link deposit guarantees to specific 
characteristics of these loans, such as their durations, and to correlations between 
business risk and interest rates.  Since the nature of bank loans has been changing over 
time, our model should predict the accompanying change in value of the government 
guarantees. 
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Traditional models of deposit insurance assume that a bank's assets follow an 
exogenously provided stochastic process.  If  the process is Geometric Wiener, then, as 
Merton [I9771 has shown, an isomorphic correspondence exists between loan guarantees 
and common-stock put options, and a simple formula exists for deposit insurance. 
Merton's analysis has since been extended in a number of ways.  Merton [1978], for 
example, evaluates the cost of deposit insurance taking into account surveillance costs 
and random auditing times.  Buser, Chen, and Kane [198:L] and Marcus [I9841 introduce 
charter values into the analysis. McCulloch [1981a] and Crouhy and Galai [I9911 
consider the implications of interest rate risk, and Ritchken et al. [I9931 consider the case 
where the bank adapts its portfolio and capital structure decisions dynamically in order to 
exploit the insurance subsidy more fully.' 
The objective of this study is to develop models of deposit guarantees that capture 
more realism than existing models, thereby permitting a wider range of analyses to be 
performed.  We extend the literature by modeling bank assets as risky debt issued by 
firms.2  The value of this debt is equivalent to a portfolio consisting of a long position in 
default-free bonds and a short position in put options on the assets of the bank's loan 
customers.  The value of the put options, in turn, depends on the investment and 
financing decisions of the bank's loan customers.  Pushing bank asset risk back to the 
level of the borrowing firms allows us to explore several new areas more thoroughly than 
have previous models.  For example, the current literature has not explicitly focused on 
how the types of loans made by banks affect the value of deposit guarantees. There is a 
strand of literature that shows how regulatory policies increase the correlation of default 
risk across bank portfolios (Penati and Protopapadakis [1988]) as well as across assets in 
a given bank's portfolio (Flannery [1989]).  However, little attention has been focused on 
how the characteristics of bank loan customers affect the value of deposit guarantees. 
What we do know is that these characteristics continue to change over time.  Boyd and 
Gertler [1994], for example, report that the nature of risky loans made by banks has 
changed significantly over the last decade, and these changes may have important 
consequences for deposit insurance.  By pushing back asset risk to the level of the 
The literature on deposit insurance is vast.  For a review, see Flood [I9901 and Merton and Bodie 119921. 
When bank assets are modeled as risky debt, the upside gains are limited to the principal and interest on 
the loans.  Ignoring this cap on asset-value appreciation may overstate the potential gains from moral hazard 
and hence may lead to high-biased estimates of the value of deposit guarantees. 
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particular, the value of risky loans, and hence of deposit guarantees, is influenced by the 
capital structure of the borrowing firms, by correlation effects between the assets of the 
firm and interest rates, by loan duration, and by other borrower-related factors. 
Discerning these linkages is crucial for understanding how regulatory policies can affect 
credit availability for different types of firms. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In section 11, we provide some evidence that the 
nature of loans issued by banks has changed over time.  This motivates the need for 
models of deposit insurance that explicitly capture properties of the risky loans held by 
banks.  Section I11 develops the basic model for an insured bank that invests in risky loans 
and government bonds.  Uncertainty is represented by credit and interest rate risk.  In 
section IV, an explicit model of deposit insurance is provided when no interest rate risk is 
present.  Deposit guarantees can be viewed as a put option contract on a portfolio of risky 
debt and government bonds.  Since risky debt itself is modeled as straight debt less a 
default premium (captured by a put option), the deposit guarantee is a compound option. 
Section IV analyzes this option and identifies how the quality of loans made by the bank 
affects the value of the deposit guarantee.  Section V generalizes the model when interest 
rate risk is present.  With two sources of uncertainty, the value of the deposit guarantee 
depends on the correlation between credit and interest rate risks and other factors. 
Section VI summarizes the paper. 
II.  The Changing Role of Banks 
There is an ongoing debate as to the viability of banks as an industry.  Gorton and Rosen 
[I9921 find that banking is a declining industry fraught with overcapacity.  Boyd and 
Gertler [I9941 question the use of traditional measures of intermediation in assessing the 
viability of the banking industry.  They find that when one accounts for changes in the 
types of services banks provide, the industry seems to be thriving in the new, more 
competitive financial marketplace. 
While the future of banks as intermediaries is far from certain, what is clear is that 
the composition of  bank portfolios and bank customers is changing.  This is illustrated in 
figure 1, which shows trends in loan composition since 1988. The percentage of the loan 
portfolio invested in commercial and industrial (C&I) loans, once the mainstay of 
banking, has declined over time, while the portfolio shares of other types of loans 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9502.pdf(particularly commercial real estate, consumer, and home mortgage loans) have risen. 
Furthermore, the composition of bank C&I loan customers has shifted over time from 
major corporations to smaller businesses. 
Another indication of the change in bank intermediation is the changing maturity 
structure of bank assets.  Figure 2  shows that the average effective maturity of bank loans 
and total earning assets has steadily increased since 1988.  While some of this increased 
maturity intermehation is a consequence of the asymmetric treatment of credit and 
interest rate risks under the Bank for International Settlements7  risk-based capital 
guidelines (see Li et al. [1995]), the trend signals a fundamental change in the types of 
loans banks are making.  These changes in the composition and maturity structure of bank 
loan portfolios have implications for banking regulation and federal deposit ins~rance.~ 
In the following sections, we develop a simple model of an insured bank that contains 
elements which reflect the changing nature of the outstanding loans. 
III.  A Model of an Insured Bank 
We assume that the market for default-free bonds is competitive. Banks invest in risky 
loans and government bonds.  We further assume that the owners of the bank are also its 
managers.  At date 0, they fund the asset portfolio with a dollars of  equity and 
D(O)  = 1 -  a dollars of deposits fully insured by a government agency. This agency 
charges the bank a flat-rate premium per dollar of deposit. The value of deposit insurance 
at date 0, denoted by G(O), can be viewed as government-contributed capital.  The 
insurance provides depositors with full protection over the period [O,T], at which time 
they renew their deposits if the bank is solvent.  The insurer is assumed to strictly enforce 
the closure policy at date T. Specifically, if the market value of the bank's tangible assets 
is below the deposit base at this date, the bank is immediately closed. 
At date 0, the bank lends q dollars to a representative firm.  The firm has ef  dollars in 
cash and invests A(0) = (q +  ef) dollars into a risky project.  The firm owes the bank 
q*dollars,  due at date T.  Let B(t,T) be the value of the risky loan at date t.  Clearly, at 
date 0, q* is determined so that B(0,T) = q. 
McCUlloch [1981b] contends that maturity intermediation is a consequence of deposit insurance and not a 
natural form of intermediation for depository institutions. 
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Balance Sheet of Representative Firm 
Risky investment: A(0)  Loan from bank: B(0) = q 
Firm shareholder equity: e 
Total:  A(0)  Total:  ef  + q 
In addition to providing loans to firms, the bank invests I(0) =  1 -  q dollars in 
government discount bonds with maturity date s. Let P(t, s) be the date t price of a 
default-free pure discount bond that pays $1 at date s.  Since P(0, s) is the price of a pure 
discount bond at date 0, the number of bonds purchased is (1 -  q)  / P(0,  s)  . 
The bank raises D(0) =  1 -  a dollars in deposits, with shareholders providing a 
dollars.  The bank's deposits are guaranteed by the government.  The value of the subsidy 
arising from these guarantees is G(0).  The balance sheet of the bank at date 0 is shown 
below. 
Balance Sheet of Bank 
Risky loan:  B(0, T) = q  Deposits:  D(0) = 1 -  a 
Default-free loan:  I(0) =  1 -  q  Shareholder equity:  e(0) 
Government subsidy:  G(0) 
Total:  1 + G(0)  Total:  (1-a) + e(0) 
Shareholder equity at date 0, represented by e(O), is therefore given by 
e(0) = a + G(0).  (1) 
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representative firm and the evolution of the yield curve.  The dynamics of the risky 
investment are given by 
with A(0) = e  + q . Here, p, (A, t) is the drift term, 0,  is the instantaneous volatility, 
and dz(t) is the standard Wiener increment. 
Bond prices are linked to forward rates by 
Here, f(t, x) is the instantaneous forward rate at time t for the time increment [x, x+dx]. 
Forward rates are assumed to follow a diffusion process of the form 
with the forward rate function,  f(O,.),  initialized to the observed value.  Here, p  (t,s), 
of  (t,s), and dw(t) are the drift, the volatility structure, and the Wiener increment, 
respectively.  We assume that all forward rates are correlated with the asset returns. In 
particular, ~{dw(t),  dz(t)} = pdt . We follow Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (hereafter 
HJM) [I9921 and assume that of  (t, .)  is an exponentially dampened function of the form 
where o,  DO.  Under this model, HJM show that the price of a bond at date t is related to 
its price at date 0 through 
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They also show that the dynamics of the state variable, r(t), are given by 
where, for pricing purposes, the drift can be taken as4 
Now consider the value of the risky loan at date t, 0 i  t I T.  Following Merton [1977], a 
risky loan with face value q*  is equivalent to default-free debt together with a short 
position in a put option on the firm's assets with exercise price q*  and expiration date T. 
At expiration, if the firm cannot pay q*  ,  it surrenders its assets to the bank. Hence, 
where PE  (t,T;q*) is the value of  the put option.  For the volatility structure given in 
equation (6), Ritchken and Sankarasubramanian [I99  11 show that 
pE(t,  T;q*) =  q *  N(-d2)-A(t)N(-d  1,  ) 
where 
and 
In particular, any European interest rate claim with a cash payment at date s can be priced as 
C(0) =  ~~[ex~(~~r(x)dr)C(~)],  where the expectation is taken under the process in equation (7). 
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loan in equation (8) simplifies, with the put price computed using equation (9b) below. 
where 
The value of the default-free position at date t, I(t), is given by 
For certain interest rates, the above equation reduces to 
Let V(t) be the value of the firm's "tangible" assets at date t.  Specifically, 
The duration of the deposit base is assumed to be z.  At that date, the level of deposits is 
given by 
If interest rates are certain and constant, then equation (1  2a) reduces to 
D(z) = (1 -  a)en. 
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the deposits. 
IV.  Pricing Deposit Guarantees under Interest Rate Certainty 
Consider a bank with capital a,  deposits 1-a,  and investment consisting of q dollars in 
risky loans of maturity T plus 1-q dollars in default-free bonds.  The q dollars are 
combined with ef dollars of firm-supplied capital and are invested in a risky project. 
Since there is no interest rate uncertainty, the risk premium for the risky debt can be 
computed using equations (8) and (9b).  In particular, the face value of the debt, q*, is 
given by the solution to 
where PE  (0, T;qt) is given in equation (9b).  The value of the government subsidy at date 
2, G(z), is given by 
Substituting for D(z) and V(z), from equations (lob), (1 I), and (12b) we obtain 
where K(a,  q; q*  ) is a constant given by 
Equation (15) shows that the government subsidy is a rather complex compound option. 
The fair price of the deposit guarantee at date 0, G(O), is given by 
where the expectation is taken under the risk-neutralized process given by equation (2), 
with the drift term taken as p,(A,t)  =  rA(t). 
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Proposition 
Consider a bank with capital a, deposits I-a,  and investment consisting of q dollars in 
risky loans of maturity T and I-q  dollars in default-free bonds.  The deposits earn the 
riskless rate r over the period to the audit date, T, with ZI  T. The value of the q dollars 
is combined with ef dollars offirm-supplied capital and is invested in a risky project, 
with volatility 0,. The value of  the government guarantee at date 0  is given by G(O), 
where 
where 
and N,  (x,  y;p) is the cumulative standard bivariate normal distribution, evaluated at 
(x, y) when the correlation coejjicient is p. 
Proofi  See appendix. 
Figure 3 shows the sensitivity of the government guarantee to the maturity of the risky 
debt.  Notice that as the duration of the loan increases, so too does the risk and the value 
of the government subsidy. For large maturity values over the time to the audit date, the 
dynamics of the bond are somewhat similar to the dynamics of an asset.  However, for 
shorter maturity loans, the dynamics of the bond become more predictable as its value is 
drawn toward its face value.  Figure 3 also shows the sensitivity of the government 
subsidy to the leverage ratio of the representative borrowing firm.  As this ratio expands, 
the risk of default increases, as does the value of the government subsidy.  In an interest- 
rate-certainty environment, the bank will exploit the government guarantee by providing 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9502.pdfthe most risky loans.  This is accomplished by providing long-term funds to the most 
highly leveraged firms. 
For the degenerate case, when T=T, equation (17) reduces to 
and hence 
where 
dl = [ln[A(O) I (q -  a)]  + o:z  I 21 I o,& 
d, =d, --%A 
Moreover, in this case the payout to the bank's shareholders at date z is given by 
Substituting equations (13b), (1 lb), and (12) into the above expression, we obtain 
(a-q)e"  +q*  if  A(z) 2 q* 
e(z) = 
Max[O, (a -  q)e"  -t A(z)]  otherwise. 
Figure 4 shows the payouts to the bank at date z. Note that the bank's maximum upside 
potential is limited to (a  -  q)en +  q*. This cap stands in contrast to most models of 
deposit insurance, which assume that the underlying assets have unlimited upside 
potential. 
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Most studies of government guarantees have been developed in a framework where there 
is only one source of uncertainty. When multiple sources of uncertainty are considered, 
many of these results are overt~rned.~ 
We now consider a model of deposit guarantees in which there are multiple 
sources of uncertainty.  In particular, we consider the additional effect on guarantees 
when interest rates are stochastic. Clearly, interest rate risk interacts with asset risk, 
altering the overall risk exposure and affecting the value of the government subsidy.  In 
this section, we explore how these two uncertainties affect the value of deposit 
guarantees. 
Equation (14) gives the value of deposit insurance at date z, G(z), under interest 
rate uncertainty.  Substituting for D(z) and V(z) using equations (8), (lOa), and (12a) 
yields 
where 
and PE (z, T;q*)  is given in equation (9a).  The fair price of the deposit guarantee for this 
bank is given by 
where the expectation is taken over the joint risk-neutralized process given by 
As an example, in an interest-rate-certain  economy, capital regulations (as embodied in the current risk- 
based standards) and charter regulations are substitute policies.  However, when interest rates are uncertain, 
Li et al. [I9951 have shown that this result does not hold. 
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A bivariate binomial lattice was established to numerically determine the value for G(0).6 
Figure 5 shows the value of the government subsidy for loans with different maturities. 
Given any correlation coefficient, the graph indicates that the value of the government 
guarantee increases with maturity.  It can also be seen that deposit guarantee values are 
more sensitive to maturity extensions when the correlation between interest rates and 
assets moves toward 
Figure 6 shows the sensitivity of deposit guarantees to correlation changes for a 
fixed-maturity loan.  As the correlation moves toward +1, the riskless bonds and loan 
portfolio tend to form a natural hedge, reducing variability and decreasing the value of the 
government subsidy.  If regulators are interested in the escalating costs associated with 
the moral hazard issues of deposit guarantees, then their policies should consider the 
nature of the loans made by banks and, in particular, the correlation effects between 
interest rates and the businesses in which the bank's customers operate. 
VI.  Conclusion 
We provide a model for deposit insurance that considers the bank's financing and 
investment decisions.  In particular, we assume that the bank invests in a portfolio of 
default-free bonds and risky loans.  Since the value of the risky loans depends on the 
investment decisions of the borrowing firm, the value of the deposit guarantee is 
connected to firm characteristics.  By pushing back uncertainty to the level of the 
borrowing firm, we are able to explore how factors like firm leverage, loan maturity, and 
For a discussion of bivariate binomial lattice procedures, see Boyle, Evnine, and Gibbs [1989]. 
Negative correlation implies that bond prices and loan portfolios are positively correlated. 
12 
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deposit guarantee.  Future work will look at both the implications of alternative 
regulatory systems for deposit insurance and credit availability for bank customers. 
Our model has some interesting implications for deposit insurance.  First, we 
show that the correlation between different risks should be incorporated into any 
regulatory mechanisms for deposit guarantees, whether they are explicit (risk-based 
premiums) or implicit (regulatory taxes). Indeed, when banks face multiple sources of 
risk, regulators need multiple regulatory toolsto minimize innovative risk-shifting 
behavior by insured banks.  Second,.we  show that a consequence of deposit insurance is a 
preference by banks to increase the mismatch between the durations of their assets and 
liabilities, a phenomenon referred to by McCulloch [1981b] as misintermediation.8  Our 
numerical results are consistent with the increased average maturity of bank loans and 
earning assets shown in figures 2 and 3. 
The fact that bank investments have limited upside potential implies that gains to 
shareholders from increased risk-taking are essentially capped.  This implies that moral 
hazard considerations may be less important than previous analyses suggest. 
In our analysis, we assume the existence of a representative firm. In practice, 
banks hold a portfolio of loans.  While the direction of our results will remain unchanged, 
it is important to note that the beneficial role of reducing credit-related risk by 
diversifying loans is not captured. It remains for future work to establish models that 
assesss the impact of these additional portfolio effects. 
This maturity mismatch problem will be accentuated by the current risk-based capital guidelines, which 
asymmetrically tax credit and interest rate risks. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9502.pdfReferences 
Boyd, J., and M. Gertler, 1994, "Are Banks Dead, or Are the Reports Greatly 
Exaggerated?"  Proceedings from a Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (May), 85-  1  17. 
Boyle, P.,  J. Evnine, and S. Gibbs, 1989, "Numerical Evaluation of Multivariate 
Claims," Review of Financial Studies 2, 241-250. 
Buser, S. A., A. H. Chen, and E. J. Kane, 1981, "Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory 
Policy, and Optimal Bank Capital," Journal of Finance 36,51-60. 
Crouhy, M., and D. Galai, 1991, "A Contingent Claim Analysis of a Regulated 
Depository Institution," Journal of Banking and Finance 15 (January), 73-90. 
Flannery, M. J., 1989, "Capital Regulation and Insured Banks' Choice of Individual Loan 
Default Risks," Journal of Monetary Economics 24,235-258. 
Rood, M., 1990, "On the Use of Option Pricing Models to Analyze Deposit Insurance," 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review 72 (January/February), 19-35. 
Gorton, G., and R. Rosen, 1992, "Corporate Control, Portfolio Choice, and the Decline of 
Baking," Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Finance and Economics 
Discussion Series No. 2 15 (December). 
Heath, D., R. Jarrow, and A. Morton, 1992, "Bond Pricing and the Term Structure of 
Interest Rates: A New Methodology for Contingent Claims Valuation," Econometrics 60, 
77-105. 
Li, A.,  P. Ritchken, L. Sankarasubramanian, and J. B. Thomson, 1995, "Regulatory 
Taxes, Investment, and Financing Decisions for Insured Banks," Proceedings from a 
Conference on ~ank  Structure and Competition, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
(May), forthcoming. 
Marcus, A., 1984, "Deregulation and Bank Financial Policy," Journal of Banking and 
Finance 8 (December), 557-565. 
McCulloch, J. H.,  1981a, "Interest-Rate Risk and Capital Adequacy for Traditional Banks 
and Financial Intermediaries,"  in Sherman Maisel, ed., Risk and Capital Adequacy in 
Commercial Banks. University of Chicago Press and National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Chicago. 
McCulloch, J. H., 1981b, "Misintermediation and Macroeconomic Fluctuations," 
Journal of Monetary Economics 8 (July), 103-  1  15. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9502.pdfMerton, R., 1977, "An Analytic Derivation of the Cost of  Deposit Insurance and Loan 
Guarantees: An Application of  Modern Option Pricing Theory," Journal of Banking and 
Finance 1 (June), 3- 1  1. 
Merton, R., 1978, "On the Cost of Deposit Insurance When There are Surveillance 
Costs," Journal of Business 5,439-452. 
Merton, R. C., and 2. Bodie, 1992, "On  the Management of Financial Guarantees," 
Financial Management 2 1 (Winter), 87-  109. 
Penati, A., and A. Protopapadakis, 1988, "The Effect of Implicit Deposit Insurance on 
Banks' Portfolio Choices with an Application to International 'Overexposure'," Journal of 
Monetary Economics 21 (January), 107-1  26. 
Ritchken, P., and L. Sankarasubrarpanian, 1991, "On Contingent Claim Valuation in a 
Stochastic Interest Rate Economy," Case Western Reserve University, Technical 
Memorandum. 
Ritchken, P., J. B. Thomson, R. P. DeGennaro, and A. Li, 1993, "On  Flexibility, Capital 
Structure, and Investment Decisions for the Insured Bank," Journal of Banking and 
Finance 17, 1133-1  146. 
Toft, B.,  1994, "Exact Formulas for Expected Hedging Error and Transaction Costs in 
Option Replication," University of California at Berkeley, Working Paper. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9502.pdfAppendix 
Lemma (Toft [1994]) 
Let  N  (0)  and N,  (o,.,  0)  denote the univariate and bivariate standard normal distribution 
functions. Then, 
Proof of Proposition 
At date z,  the value of the government subsidy is given by 
We also have that 
B(T,  T) = q*e-r'T-" -  pE  [T, T, q*] 
I(2) = (1 -  q)en 
*  -r(T-7) ,  ~(2)  =  (1 -  q)en +  q e  pE  [T,  T, q*] 
D(z) = (1 -  a)em. 
Substituting for D(z) and V(z), the time z value of the government subsidy is given by 
If  V(z) < D(z), then the value of the government subsidy is 
G(z) = (q -  a)e" -  q*e-r'T7' +  pE(r,  T;q*). 
Now, 
Pr{G(T) > 0) = Pr{D(r) > V(z)} = pripE  (T,  T, q*)  > H(T,  T)), 
where 
n  H(  2, T) =  *e-r'T-7)  -  (q -  a)  e  . 
The inequality for the put option will be satisfied when the underlying asset at date t , 
A(t), drops below some level A*. Hence, the sought probability is equal to the 
probability of the event {~(z)  < A*  (z)), where the value A*(z) is obtained by solving 
the equation pE  (2, T, q*  ) =  H(T,  T) ,  provided that H(T,  T) is posihve. 
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where 
Then, A* is a solution to 
where 
ln A*  (~)/A(o)  -  p, 7 
z  = 
0,  J? 
ln A*(s)/q* +  (r -  0:  /2)(~  -  7) 
d2 = 
0,  JF7 
Hence, Pr{G(z) > 0) =  Pr{A(z) <  A*  (7)) =  Pr{z < z*). 
In summary, then, 
if  H(z,T) I0 
Pr{G(z) > 0)  =  if  H(z,  7')  > A(z) 
Pr{A(z)<A*(z))  otherwise. 
The value of the government subsidy at date 0 is 
where the expectation is taken under the risk-neutralized process. After substituting for 
G(z), we obtain: 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9502.pdfn  * -r(T-z)]N(Z*)+e-rz  ~(O)=e-~'[(g-a)e -q  e  J  q*e-r(T-z) N(-d2)  f (s)& - 
~(r)  <A*  (r) 
-rz  e  J  A(r)N(-d,  If  (s)d 
A(r)  <A*  (r) 
Now, using the Lemma to solve the three integrals and simplifying the resulting 
expressions leads to the final result. 
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EFFECTIVE ASSET MATURITY 
Years (Assets)  Years (Loans) 
1.90  1  1  1.40 
Figure 2 shows the lengthening effective maturlty of bank loans and total bank assets.  The slight downturn in  total 
asset maturity after 1992 corresponds to a shortening of the maturlty of bank security portfolios in  reactlon to 
changes in  accounting rules that forced banks to hold a higher percentage of their security portfollos at the lesser 
of book or market value.  Effective maturity Is computed using the maturity/repricing breakdowns reported on the 
Federal Financial Examination Councii's Reports of Condition and income.  For both serles, the total dollar amount 
of assets In  each maturity/repricing bucket is weighted by the midpoint of the maturity range (except for the 
greater-than-five-year bucket, which is given a weight of 5). 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9502.pdfFigure 3 
Sensitivity of the Government Guarantee to the 
Maturity of the Risky Debt 
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Figure  3  shows  the  sensitivity  of  the  value  of  the  government guarantee,  G(O),  to 
extensions in the maturity of the risky loan. Each curve corresponds to a firm with a given 
leverage. As the leverage increases, shareholder equity, e~,  decreases, the risk expands, and 
the government guarantee becomes more valuable. 
Source: Authors. 
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Bank  Shareholder Value as a  Function  of the value of the Representative Firm 
Figure 4 shows  the  terminal  payoff  to  shareholders for the  case q>a.  In  ths case, 
shareholder equity is zero if the value of  the asset A(T) falls below (q-a)exp(rt).  The 
maximum value for shareholders occurs when the face value of  the loan is paid out.  For 
all values of the firm larger than q*, the shareholder value is capped. 
Source: Authors. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9502.pdfFigure 5 plots the value of  the government guarantee against loan duration for different 
correlation coefficients between interest rates and the representative h's  assets. As the 
correlation increases, the default-free bond portfolio and the loan become natural hedges, 
decreasing the total price variabiity and hence the value of the deposit guarantee. For any 
correlation, the value of the guarantee increases with the duration of the loan.  However, 
the rate of increase is enhanced when  the h's  assets are most highly  correlated with 
bond returns.  The case parameters are as follows:  The leverage of the representative firm 
was computed from ef  =  0.10. The default-free investments were in s  = two-year bonds, 
with q =  0.8.  The volatility structure of  forward rates was given by  equation (5), with 
o  =  0.02 and K  =  0.02. The volatility of the assets was o, =  0.20. 
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Figure 6 shows the effect of increasing the correlation between interest rates and the risky 
Sensitivity of the Government Guarantee to the Correlation 
between the Risky Project and Interest Rates 
0.0035 - 
asset. The case parameters are as follows: The leverage of  the representative firm was 
computed from ef =  0.10. The default-free investments were in s = two-year bonds, with 
q =  0.8. The volatility structure of  forward rates was given by equation (5), with o = 0.02 
and K  = 0.02. The volatility of the assets was o, =  0.20. 
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